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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
JUNE LARSON aka JUNE BECKMAN,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 920864-CA
vs.
]

ORLO LARSON,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final judgment in the Fourth Judicial
Distx
B

i

~Hvi5 presiding, affirming Commissioner Howard H. Maetani's

Order ^- Order -•- <L*r. •.---• - jv.r-e.
This

•.,-.

.•

j/j.tl . ""

7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( 2 ) ( h ) , Utah Code Annotated (1992 - a m e n d e d ) .

-".rl ion,

•
This

appeal is taken pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y r u l e t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n

I -1 •" • 0 relet I o

paymerv

the c h i l d r e n ' s Social S e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s .

illegal?

II. Did the trial court err by refusing :
provision

v w ii l I /jiiiiilii

ill

i

i I |<M|II

modify the Decree of Divorce to insure justice?
1

enforce the
| ternati ve

to

":

III.

Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's request

for attorney's fees, and should this Court award Plaintiff
attorney's fees on appeal?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A trial court's determination that the provision at issue is
illegal and consequently unenforceable is a question of law which
should be reviewed under a correction of error standard.

Fauver

v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Utah App. 1990).
A trial court's decision to strike an Order to Show Cause
and its refusal to modify a Decree of Divorce is a question of
law which is reviewed for correctness.

Grower v. Grover, 839

P.2d 871, 873 (Utah App. H,S2).
The decision to award attorney's fees is within the sound
discretion of the trial court.

Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d

814 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of the brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties to this appeal were divorced on July 18, 1985.
On January 7, 1987, the Decree of Divorce was modified based on a
stipulation between the parties. (R. 403-410).
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Defendant brought an Order to Show Cause in June of 1992 to
enforce a provision relating to the payment of the children's
Social Security benefits as contained in the Order to Modify
Decree of Divorce.

At the Order to Show Cause hearing, Plaintiff

pled that the provision was illegal. (R. 479-484).

The court

commissioner refused to enforce the provision and struck the
Order to Show Cause. (R. 504-506).
Defendant objected to the court commissioner's ruling and
filed a motion to enforce the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce
and set aside the commissioner's ruling in the district court.
The Honorable Lynn B. Davis affirmed the commissioner's ruling.
He refused to rule on Defendant's mo'cion to enforce the decree of
modification and to set *aide commissioner's ruling on the
grounds that the motions were not properly before the court. (R.
548) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the original Decree of Divorce, Defendant was ordered to
pay Plaintiff $35,000.00, with interest, in monthly payments as a
property settlement.

As a further property settlement, Defendant

was ordered to pay Plaintiff an additional $10,000.00 with a
maturity date of September 30, 1999.

Both obligations were to be

secured by a deed of trust on real property.
Defendant was also ordered to pay child support in the

3

amount of $250.00 per month for the use and benefit of the two
minor children.
The Decree of Divorce was modified in January of 1987. A
provision in the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce stated that in
the event Defendant retired or died Plaintiff was required to
place the minor children's Social Security benefits in a trust
account.

The children's Social Security benefits would then be

used to satisfy, among other things, Defendant's child support
obligation as well as his $10,000.00 property settlement
obligation to Plaintiff.1 (R. 469). (A copy of the Order to
Modify Decree of Divorce is contained in Appellant's Brief at
24) .
Defendant retired in July of 1992 at age 62.

Plaintiff

began receiving Social Security checks on behalf of the children.
Subsequently, Plaintiff learned from the Social Security
Administration that the provision may be illegal and that any
misuse or misappropriation of the children's Social Security
benefits may constitute a federal felony.

(A copy of a letter

sent by the Social Security Administration is contained in
Appendix A).

Plaintiff refused to place the children's Social

Security benefits in the trust account.

1

Paragraph 3 of the original divorce decree, dated July
18, 1985, also provides that the children's excess Social
Security benefits would be used to reduce the amount of
indebtedness on the property settlement between the parties.
4

Defendant brought an Order to Show Cause but did not bring a
Petition to Modify.

The court commissioner ruled that the above-

stated provision was illegal and struck the Order to Show Cause.
Defendant objected to the commissioner's ruling and made various
other motions. (R. 548).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Illegality of Stipulation
Paragraph 3c(1) of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce is
illegal.

It requires the minor children's excess Social Security

benefits be used to pay off Defendant's property settlement
obligation to Plaintiff.

This provision violates the relevant

Social Security statutes and regulations which make clear that
children's Social Security benefits may only be used for the
support and maintenance of the children.

Any other or improper

use may constitute conversion, which is a federal felony.
Enforcement of the Illegal Stipulation
If a stipulation is found to be illegal, the court has no
choice but to declare the provision null and void.

There is no

necessity for a party to file a motion for relief from judgment.
Modification
A party seeking modification must file a Petition to Modify
and that party must prove a permanent and substantial change of
circumstances necessitating the modification.

Defendant filed an

Order to Show Cause but failed to file a Petition to Modify.
5

He

also failed to present any evidence of permanent and substantial
change of circumstances, which is required to obtain a
modification.

The proper course for Defendant to have obtained a

modification is to file a Petition to Modify.
Attorneyfs Fees
Defendant presented no evidence on any of the factors
relevant in awarding attorneyfs fees.
fees is without merit.

His claim for attorneys

Plaintiff should be awarded attorney's

fees on appeal as a result of having to defend this frivolous
appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PROVISION IN
THE ORDER TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE WHICH ALLOWS THE
MINOR CHILDREN'S SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS BE USED TO
PAY OFF DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IS ILLEGAL.
Paragraph 3c(1) of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce
states:
It is ordered that Defendant, in order to obtain Plaintiff's
release of Trust Deed and Notice of Interest, ...
c.
Pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $10,000.00 on or before
September 30, 1999 as follows:
(1) The benefits which the children of the parties may
receive as a result of Defendant's death or retirement are
ordered escrowed in a trust account at Zion's Bank, Spanish Fork
Branch, and are ordered disbursed to pay:
(a)

To the bank to pay fees of administering the

account

6

(b) To Plaintiff to pay $125 per month per child,
child support when due
(c) The balance is ordered held in an interestbearing trust account, in the name of June Larson and credited
for the payment of the property settlement payment of $10,000.00
until such time as the balance held equals the then-present value
of $10,000.00 due October 1, 1999, when calculated using Zion's
Bank's prime rate at the time of the calculation. At the time
the balance reaches the specified amount to satisfy the
requirements set forth in this paragraph it is ordered
immediately disbursed to Plaintiff in satisfaction of the
$10,000.00 property settlement obligation, the account will be
closed and all of the benefits which the children are entitled to
receive as a result of Defendant's death or retirement will be
paid to Defendant or Defendant's estate. From that amount,
Defendant will continue to pay his child support obligation of
$125.00 per month per child.
The Social Security Act, Title 42, United States Code
Section 401 et seq., provides that every dependent child of an
individual who is entitled to Social Security benefits shall be
entitled to a child's insurance benefit.

Social Security

Regulations require that such payments to a representative payee
on behalf of a beneficiary must be used for current maintenance
of the beneficiary.

Any benefits not needed for current

maintenance must be conserved or invested on the beneficiary's
behalf.

Social Security Administration Regulations No. 4-Subpart

Q, Sections 404.1604, 404.1605.

See also, Meeks v. Mutual of

Omaha Insurance Company, 388 N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (111. App. 1979).
20 C.F.R. Chapter III Section 404.2035 unequivocally states
that a representative payee, the Plaintiff in this case, may only
use the children's Social Security benefits for the use,

7

maintenance, and care of the children themselves.

This section

provides:
A representative payee has a responsibility to(a) Use the payments he or she receives only for the
use and benefit of the beneficiary in a manner and for the
purposes he or she determines, under the guidelines in this
subpart, to be in the best interests of the beneficiary;
(b) Notify us of any event that will affect the amount
of the benefits the beneficiary receives or the right of the
beneficiary to receive benefits;
(c) Submit to us, upon our request, a written report
accounting for the benefits received; and
(d) Notify us of any change in his or her
circumstances that would affect performance of the payee
responsibilities.
The core essence of Title II of the Social Security Act
benefit scheme is that those benefits are to be used only on
behalf of the minor beneficiary.

Frazier v. Pinqree, 612 F.Supp

345, 347 (D.C. Fla. 1985).
The children's Social Security benefits are to be used
exclusively for their current maintenance.

Current maintenance

includes costs incurred in obtaining food, shelter, clothing,
medical care, and personal comfort items.

20 C.F.R. Chapter III

Section 404.2040.
Paragraph 3c(1) of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce, if
enforceable, would require that Defendant's $10,000.00 property
settlement obligation to Plaintiff be paid out of the proceeds of
the minor children's Social Security benefits.

8

Defendant's

property settlement obligation is unrelated to Defendant's duty
of support or to the children's maintenance.

This paragraph is

illegal because it violates both Sections 404.2035 and 404.2040.
The parties in this case had no authority, power or right
to bargain away the Social Security benefits of the minor
children.

The children's right to receive Social Security

benefits belongs to them.

A child's right to support is an

"unalienable right, belonging to the child, and cannot be
bartered away by the child's parent or parents."

Fauver v.

Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1278-79 (Utah App. 1990)(citations
omitted).
The facts in Fuller v. Fuller, 360 N.E.2d 357 (Ohio App.2d
1976) are similar to the case at bar.

In Fuller, the Defendant

was substantially in arrears in his child support when he became
disabled.

Because of his disability, the minor children were

awarded $268.00 per month in Social Security benefits.
amount was $68.00 more than the child support order.

This

Id. at 358.

In a judgment order, the trial court found that the
Defendant was in arrears in child support.

The court ordered

that the excess Social Security benefits could be credited toward
Defendant's arrearage in child support.

Ibid.

In reversing the trial court's holding, the appellate court
stated:
[T]he benefit inures directly to the child,
notwithstanding the prerequisite status of
9

the parent. No indices of the father's
ownership ever attach to these funds. Thus
the court is, in effect, ordering the
children to pay the accrued arrearages for
their own support. Ibid.
It should be noted that even though in Fuller the excess
Social Security benefits were used to pay off past due child
support obligations, which are related to the children's
maintenance, the appellate court nevertheless reversed the trial
court's ruling.

See also. Smith v. Smith, 651 P.2d 1209, 1210

(Ariz. App. 1982)(child's excess Social Security benefits cannot
be used to satisfy Defendant's obligation to pay the medical and
dental bills of the children); Meeks v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Company, 388 N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (111. App. 1979)(payments made to
representative payee are not income to the payee but are income
to and the exclusive property of the minor child).

In the case

at bar, the excess Social Security benefits were to be used to
pay off Defendant's property settlement obligation, which is not
remotely related to the children's maintenance.
20 C.F.R. Chapter III Section 404.2035 and 404.2040, Title
II of the Social Security Act Section 202(d)(1), Social Security
Regulations, and case law make clear that paragraph 3c(1) of the
Order to Modify Decree of Divorce is illegal and consequently
unenforceable.

This court should uphold the trial court's

finding that the paragraph is illegal and unenforceable as a
matter of law.
10

POINT II
A COURT MAY NOT ENFORCE AN ILLEGAL PROVISION IN A
DECREE OF DIVORCE OR MODIFY IT ABSENT A PETITION TO
MODIFY.
Defendant in his brief apparently argues that even if the
provision is illegal, the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to either enforce the decree or modify it despite its
illegality because of Defendants alleged reliance on it.
Defendants reasoning is that even if the stipulation is
illegal, the parties are bound by their stipulations unless
relieved from them by motion to the court and in the interests of
justice and fair play.

In order to withdraw a stipulation, the

party must file a timely motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which must be done within three
months.

(Brief of Appellant at 8-11).

Defendant concludes that because Plaintiff failed to file a
Rule 60(b) motion and because Defendant relied upon the
stipulation, the court should enforce it.

Defendant cites

Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah 1990), in support of this
reasoning.
A.

Maxwell v. Maxwell.

The facts and holding in Maxwell are easily distinguishable
from the case at bar.

Consequently, Maxwell provides little, if

any, help in resolving the issues in this appeal.

In Maxwellf

the parties were divorced pursuant to a stipulated divorce
11

decree.

The parties stipulated that the wife would receive one-

half of the husband's total monthly retirement benefit.

The

husband began paying the wife one-half of his gross retirement
benefits.

Subsequently, the husband received an increase in

these benefits, but failed to account or pay the wife her onehalf share of the increase.

The wife filed an Order to Show

Cause seeking her one-half share of the total retirement benefits
as provided in the stipulated decree.
On appeal, the husband argued that the trial courtfs order
violated the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10
U.S.C.A. Section 1408 (1983)( hereinafter USFSPA).

Under the

USFSPA, state courts are allowed to treat disposable retirement
pay as community property divisible upon divorce.

They are not

authorized to treat total retirement pay as community or marital
property divisible upon divorce.
The husband alleged mistake in entering the stipulation in
order to avoid the stipulation and avoid liability for the
payments he failed to make.

This Court held that the stipulation

was binding upon the husband and that he could not avoid
liability by claiming mistake.

This Court also refused to modify

the Decree of Divorce.
It should be noted that in Maxwell, the stipulated provision
at issue was not illegal nor did it violate the USFSPA.

The

USFSPA merely provides that a state court does not have authority
12

to treat total retirement pay as community property.

There is no

provision in the USFSPA that prevents a party from voluntarily
stipulating to pay his or her retirement benefits to his or her
former spouse.

This situation is entirely analogous to a

situation in which one spouse stipulates to giving the other
spouse his or her separate property as part of a division of the
parties' marital property.

Upon becoming disenchanted with the

property distribution, the spouse then claims mistake of fact in
entering the stipulation to avoid his or her stipulations on the
grounds that the trial court does not have authority to award
separate property.
In short, the husband in Maxwell was claiming mistake of
fact to avoid liability.

He had voluntarily entered an agreement

to pay his ex-wife one-half of his total retirement benefits.
These total retirement benefits were his own property and even
though the court did not have authority to award these benefits
to the wife, the husband was certainly free to do with them as he
pleased.

To avoid the stipulation, the proper course would have

been to file a Rule 60(b) motion.
The case at bar is entirely different.

The parties are

bargaining away the children's benefits.
[T]he right to receive child support is an
unalienable right, belonging to the child,
and cannot be bartered away by the child's
parent or parents. Fauver v. Hansen, 803
P.2d at 1278.
13

Neither party in the case at bar had the power or authority
to enter any stipulation or agreement to barter away property
that belongs exclusively to the minor children.

A child's Social

Security benefits may not be used to discharge a parent's
personal debt not related to the support of the child.

20 C.F.R.

Chapter III Section 404.2035 and 404.2040.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff is not claiming mistake of
fact as in Maxwell.

The provision is illegal and is

unenforceable as matter of law.

In fact, if the provision is

enforced, Plaintiff could be subject to being charged with a
federal felony.

(See letter from Social Security Administration

contained in Appendix A, warning Plaintiff that misuse of
Security Social funds is a federal felony).
B.

Enforcement of the Illegal Stipulation.

Defendant also alleges in his brief that parties are
unconditionally bound by their stipulations unless they file the
proper motions for relief from judgment.

Although courts

ordinarily pay strong attention and enforce stipulations between
parties, courts are not bound by parties' stipulations when
points of law requiring judicial determinations are involved.

A

court has the power to set aside a stipulation entered into
inadvertently or for justifiable cause.

First of Denver Mortgage

Investors v. C.N. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979)(citations
omitted).
14

The above language illustrates that a court may set aside a
judgment, order, or proceeding for any justifiable cause.

There

is no requirement that a party must file a Rule 60(b) motion as
Defendant incorrectly contends.
The justifiable cause language in First of Denver certainly
contemplates and encompasses the setting aside of any provision
which is illegal.

Otherwise, parties could circumvent any

statutory or case law by merely stipulating to agreements that
are illegal or contrary to legal principles.
Contrary to Defendants argument that a court should enforce
a provision despite its illegality to insure justice, case law
unequivocally establishes that the effect of an illegal contract
or agreement is that it is null and void and a court has no other
choice but to declare the contract provision unenforceable.
No principle of law is better settled than
that a party to an illegal contract cannot
come into a court of law and ask to have his
illegal objects carried out;...the law in
short will not aid either party to an illegal
agreement; it leaves the parties were it
finds them.
17 C.J.S. Section 272 p. 1188.
Every contract in violation of law is void and the courts
will not lend their aid to the enforcement of, nor permit a
recovery under contracts made in violation of law prohibiting
them or declaring them unlawful.
555 (Utah 1922).

Baker v. Latses. 206 P. 553,

See also Neil v. Utah Wholesale Grocery
15

Company, 210 P. 201, 203 (Utah 1922)(contract made in
contravention of a statute is void and unenforceable).
For the court to enter a finding in contravention of
statutory requirements is in direct violation of the statutory
duty of that court to provide for the support of the minor
children of the parties to a divorce action•

Bingham v. Bingham,

629 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Okl. App. 1981).
C.

Modification of Decree.

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by not modifying the Decree of Divorce to insure justice.

In

order to modify a decree, a party must file a petition to modify
pursuant to Rule 6-404 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

That rule provides:

(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree
shall be commenced by the filing of a
petition to modify in the original divorce
action. No request for a modification of an
existing decree shall be raised by way of an
order to show cause (emphasis added).
A party may not proceed by means of an Order to Show Cause,
but is required to file a Petition to Modify the child support
order and demonstrate therein that there has been a material
change of circumstances since the entry of the order that
warrants modification under Section 78-45-7(10), Utah Code
Annotated (1992 as amended).

Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871, 873

(Utah App. 1992).

16

If there is no service pursuant to Rule 6-404 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, nor a finding of changed circumstances, a court
does not have jurisdiction to modify or amend a decree.

Adelman

v. Adelman. 815 P.2d 741, 745 (Utah App. 1991).
A party seeking modification must not only file a Petition
to Modify but must prove a substantial and permanent change of
circumstances necessitating the modification.

Kiesel v. Kiesel.

619 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Utah 1980); Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d
699, 701 (Utah 1985).
In the case at bar, Defendant filed an Order to Show Cause
instead of a Petition to Modify pursuant to Rule 6-404 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
showing of changed circumstances.

Furthermore, there was no

Therefore, the court is

without jurisdiction to modify or amend the decree, which is why
the trial court ruled that Defendants motions were not properly
before it. (See page 4 of the Ruling on Defendant1 Objection to
Ruling of Court Commissioner, Defendant's Motion to Enforce
Decree of Modification, to Set Aside Commissioner's Ruling and
For Other Relief). (Brief of Appellant at 35).

17

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by refusing to award Defendant his attorney's fees. (Brief of
Appellant at 15). The decision to award attorney's fees is
within the sound discretion of the trial court.

The award must

be based on evidence of the financial need of the other spouse to
pay and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Whitehead v.
Whitehead. 836 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah App. 1992).

The party seeking

the award of attorney's fees must offer sufficient evidence
regarding attorney's fees at trial.

The award must be supported

by evidence of the financial need of the recipient and the
reasonableness of the award.
162 (Utah App. 1989).

Mauahan v. Maucrhan, 770 P.2d 156,

Defendant proffered no evidence at the

hearing in the trial court on Defendant's objection to the court
commissioner's ruling as to any of the factors relevant in
awarding attorney's fees.
On appeal Defendant has failed to show that the trial
court's denial of attorney's fees manifests a clear abuse of
discretion.

Defendant's argument for attorney's fees is without

merit.
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Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
That rule provides that if the court determines that:
[An] appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include...reasonable
attorney's fees, to the prevailing party.
Rule 33 defines a frivolous appeal as one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on
a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law.
Plaintiff's posture on appeal is that of Appellee.

She was

forced to spend considerable attorney's fees to defend this
action both on behalf of herself and the minor children because
of Defendant's actions.
The legality of the provision in question, the effect of an
illegal provision, and a trial court's lack of jurisdiction to
modify a decree absent a Petition to Modify are all issues of
settled law.

Defendant's appeal is not grounded in fact, not

warranted by existing law, and is not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
Pursuant to the foregoing, Plaintiff would respectfully
request that she -be awarded a reasonable amount for defending
this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The provision in question is illegal because it violates
Federal Social Security Regulations and relevant case law.
19

Since

it is illegal, it cannot be enforced as Defendant contends
because courts do not have the power or authority to enforce
illegal stipulations.

The trial court did not abuse its

discretion by refusing to modify the Decree of Divorce due to
Defendant's failure to file a Petition to Modify.
claim for attorney's fees is without merit.

Defendant's

Plaintiff should be

awarded attorney's fees for defending this frivolous appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

'S/SS&
WILFORD N, HANSEN,

JR.

Counsel \ o r Dcfeendaots

Plaintftf
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed or hand-delivered true
and correct copies of the foregoing on the ^ ^
day of June,
1993, by first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Two copies to:
C. Robert Collins
405 East State Road
P.O. Box 243
American Fork, Utah 84003
Original and seven copies to:
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

W^
WILFORD N. HANSEN, JR.
Counsel for De£widcmts
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APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Social Security Administration
173 E . 100 N.
Provo, UT
84606
(800) 772-1213
July E 3 , 199B

Wil-ford Hansen,
A11 or ney-a t-1aw
117E E Highway b #7
Payson, UT 84651

Dear Mr. Hansen:
June Buckman has asked me to write you concerning the receipt of
Social Security benefits by her daughters. Her two daughters have
been receiving $470.00 each per month on the account o-f Orlo
Larson.
They would have received $312.00 each on the account of
Leonard Buckman. Part o-f the reason that they received $470.00 per
month , however, is that they were eligible on both records. The
computation involved is a complex one called a "combined family
maximum."
There is no way to "allocate" part of the payment to
each of the wage earners.
Mrs. Bukman also raised the issue of use of Social Security
benefits. CFR Sections 404 and 416 cover the responsibilities of
representative payees under the Social Security Act, as amended.
It is mandated that a representative payee (Ms. Buckman has been
the representative payee for her daughters) use the Social Security
funds to first of all provide for the current needs of the
beneficiary. After all current needs have been met, funds may be
conserved for foreseeable future needs. Any use of Social S e c u n t v
funds other than these may constitute "conversion of benefits" a
crime considered to be a federal -felony. ^->
„
^

